This study aimed to adapt the Flourishing Scale to a Chilean high school context and provide evidence of its validity. Data were collected from 1,348 students from three different Chilean schools. The results of confirmatory factor analysis supported a one–factor solution, multiple–group CFA supported gender invariance, and structural equation model indicated that the FS is related to positive and negative academic feelings. Overall, the evidence indicates that the Flourishing Scale adapted to the high school context is an instrument that produces (...) valid and reliable scores in our high school Chilean sample. (shrink)

This brief report assessed the psychometric validity and gender invariance of the School Burnout Inventory –a measure of students’ exhaustion, cynicism, and inadequacy– in a convenience sample of 972 high school Chilean students ranging between 12 and 18 years old. The results showed that: the SBI produces adequate scores in terms of reliability; two models fitted adequately fit to our sample and was invariant across gender; and the SBI scores were significantly related to other related constructs. Overall, the SBI was (...) found to be a reliable and valid inventory to assess school burnout in Chilean high school students. (shrink)

There are several approaches to the way in which standards of proof in law should be understood. In the central article in this issue, Rodrigo Coloma suggests that they should be conceived either as thresholds either as prototypes. He also offers a taxonomy of the different uses of standards of proof, which transcends their function as error distributors. In their comments on the paper, Raymundo Gama and Claudio Agüero clarify and challenge this way of understanding standards of proof. Some (...) of their criticisms are right on target, but many others are directed more at Coloma’s theoretical presuppositions than at his substantial contributions. In this paper I offer a wider context to evaluate their disagreements. (shrink)

En este trabajo se realiza una propuesta de comunicación transdisciplinar entre las ciencias cognitivas y la educación, tal y como se perfilan en el siglo XXI. En un primer lugar se contextualizan estos procesos de comunicación en el continuum histórico que transita desde los inicios del siglo pasado, con la configuración de la psicología educativa dentro del constructo de las ciencias educativas; pasando por la constitución de las ciencias cognitivas, a mediados del siglo XX que propició la emergencia de la (...) síntesis disciplinar entre las ciencias del cerebro y de la mente, para posibilitar un encuadre arraigado en el presente, y en las propuestas de consiliencia entre neurociencia cognitiva y educación. Desde este presente histórico, se efectúa una propuesta de diálogo entre las distintas epistemes (educativas y cognitivas), en relación con el fenómeno de la educación bilingüe, y en concreto en el contexto intercultural ecuatoriano. La integración de los distintos niveles de análisis que configuran un fenómeno complejo, como lo es todo fenómeno educativo, refleja cómo los intentos transdisciplinares orientados a reconocer la complejidad ontológica de un mismo objeto de estudio, requiere del diálogo entre las distintas epistemologías y metodologías implicadas. La apertura del campo educativo a las dimensiones mentales y cerebrales en su expresión cognitiva, requiere en este s. XXI procesos de apertura recíproca respecto de la influencia que el eje cultura-educación ejerce en el modelamiento de los procesos de cognición y aprendizaje. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo investiga la forma en que las ciencias sociales, principalmente chilenas, están respondiendo a las dispares demandas que reciben actualmente y que consisten en aportar a la comprensión crítica de fenómenos relevantes para la sociedad y adecuarse a las recientes transformaciones en la forma de producir y comunicar conocimiento científico incorporando mayores niveles de internacionalización, globalización, especialización y complejización. Para ello se realiza una revisión sistemática de la producción científica publicada sobre el movimiento estudiantil chileno, que constituye (...) uno de los movimientos sociales más relevantes de la historia reciente de Chile. Se sistematizaron 149 publicaciones editadas entre el año 2000 y el 2016. Los resultados muestran que la capacidad de las ciencias sociales chilenas para abordar estas demandas contradictorias es parcial, pues sus análisis críticos tienden a ser uniformes y de alcance temporal limitado, mientras que sus estudios empíricos no siempre poseen los niveles de internacionalización y complejidad demandados actualmente para participar en los circuitos internacionales de publicación.: The present work investigates the way in which social sciences, mainly Chilean, are responding to different demands that they are currently receiving and that consist of contribute to the critical understanding of phenomena relevant to society and adapt to recent transformations in the way of producing and communicating scientific knowledge, incorporating higher levels of internationalization, globalization, specialization and complexity. To this end, a systematic review of the scientific production published on the Chilean student movement is made. This movement is one of the most relevant in Chile's recent history. 149 publications were systematized, published between 2000 and 2016. The results show that the capacity of the Chilean social sciences to deal with these contradictory demands is partial, since their critical analyzes tend to be uniforms and limited in time, while their empirical studies do not always have the levels of internationalization and complexity currently demanded in international publishing circuits. (shrink)

International research enrolling human subjects has raised an ethical concern regarding the just distribution of benefits between the countries that design the research and the host communities. Although several universal declarations have expressed this concern, a gap between theory and practice continues to exist, as well as a significant divergence between the design of the research protocol and the social context where it will be implemented. Although institutional review boards have made a valuable effort to evaluate international research, their sensitivity (...) to the just sharing of research benefits as well as their attention to the social context must be evaluated. This article analyzes the distribution of benefits in a review of international research in Mexico and produces an ethical reflection based on the results. (shrink)

Most non-human animals live in the wild and it is probable that suffering predominates in their lives due to natural events. Humans may at some point be able to engage in paradise engineering, or the modification of nature and animal organisms themselves, to improve the well-being of wild animals. We may, in other words, make nature 'red in tooth and claw' no more. We argue that this creates a tension between environmental ethics and animal ethics which is likely insurmountable. First, (...) we argue that concern for the environment can be compatible with helping individual wild animals but should see redesigning nature as morally impermissible. Second, we argue that if we are concerned with animal well-being, we may reject that we have a duty to help wild animals even to the point of redesigning nature, but we must nevertheless concede that it is permissible to do so under certain circumstances. We show how this permissibility can be derived from three animal rights views: Tom Regan's, a novel account inspired by Thomas Pogge and a libertarian approach to animal rights. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

Most nonhuman animals live on the terms imposed on them by human beings. This condition of being under the mastery of another, or domination, is what republicanism identifies as political unfreedom. Yet there are several problems that must be solved in order to successfully extend republicanism to animals. Here I focus on the question of whether freedom can be a benefit for individuals without a free will. I argue that once we understand the grounds that make freedom a desirable property (...) of choices, we can see how it is appropriate to predicate it of those made by any sentient agent. (shrink)

Wild animals probably have net negative lives. Christine Korsgaard rejects the view that we might engineer paradise by redesigning nature and animals so that they have the best possible existences. She believes the genetic changes required would not be identity-preserving, thereby causing animals to cease to exist. I argue, first, that paradise engineering is permissible. Many harms are caused by non-sentient natural entities and processes. Moreover, sentient animals can survive modifications compatible with their psychological persistence over time. Second, we are (...) required to re-engineer nature in order to satisfy animals' right to the resources necessary for a reasonable life. (shrink)

Women oppression is a universal reality. She is a victim, the exploited, the dominated and the other. As a postcolonial thinker, I argue that Filipino women have been victims of the movement of social dialectics. As Philippine society evolved and developed, she had been a victim not only of male domination but also of political economy. This research shows how female subordination and male domination emerged in the Philippines. As such, it contends that there is a blurring identity of Filipino (...) women -that is, Filipino women as situated in the neocolonial period - are victims of political economy and male domination. (shrink)

Nonhuman animals are unable to exert any direct control over the functioning of democratic institutions –the decisions of which, nevertheless, have a pervasive impact on their lives. Their interests are therefore likelier to be set back or unfairly discounted, and their choices are more vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Because of this, some authors have suggested that we ought to redesign our political institutions so that they are more responsive to the interests of animals. We argue that this strategy fails to (...) address the root of the problem, which is animals’ lack of robust political agency. We defend that, should it become technologically feasible, we have a pro tanto obligation, derived from the values that underpin democracy, to uplift, or radically enhance, the political agency of nonhuman animals, so that they can better participate in mass democratic politics, express their interests as they see them, self-organise to defend them, and hold their representatives accountable. Finally, we explain how our argument manages to resist the most important objections against animal enhancement and, in some cases, it does so better than alternative proposals based on the value of animal well-being. (shrink)

Os textos reunidos neste livro foram originalmente apresentados no Colóquio Internacional Kátharsis, realizado pelo programa de pós-graduação em Filosofia da FAFICH/UFMG. Os textos têm como tema compartilhado o conceito de catarse e apresentam perspectivas bem distintas - vão desde a origem do conceito na Grécia antiga até sua atualidade no mundo contemporâneo, levando em consideração seus diferentes momentos e apresentando grande diversidade nos enfoques adotados pelos colaboradores.

On expectation, most wild animals have lives of net suffering due to naturogenic causes. Some have claimed that concern for their well-being gives us reasons to intervene in nature on their behalf. Against this, it has been said that many interventions to assist wild animals would be wrong, even if successful, because they would violate their freedom. According to the Freedom-based Approach I defend in this paper, this view is misguided. Concern for wild animal freedom does indeed gives us reasons (...) to secure these animals against control-undermining interferences, but also to intervene in nature in order to enrich their choices. (shrink)

RESUMENEste trabajo describe y analiza el libro de Roberto Augusto En defensa del ateísmo, publicado en 2012 por la editorial Laetoli de Pamplona (Colección «Libros abiertos»). La lectura de este libro, de indiscutible valor intelectual y claridad expositiva, induce de modo difícil de evitar a una reflexión personal. Más allá de una defensa del ateísmo, y de un alegato contra la religión (casi en exclusiva, la cristiana), razonado y razonable, el libro lleva al lector al planteamiento de la pregunta por (...) la más grave de todas las cuestiones filosóficas, la «costa de la metafísica», y ello desde una perspectiva personal. Es lo que he tratado de plasmar en mis reflexiones, que no suponen tanto una crítica de la obra cuanto un intento de prolongar su meditación.PALABRAS CLAVEATEÍSMO, FILOSOFÍA DE LA RELIGIÓN, CREENCIA, ROBERTO AUGUSTOABSTRACTThis note describes and analyzes the book by Roberto Augusto En defensa del ateísmo (Laetoli: Pamplona, 2012). The reading of this undoubtedly clear and valuable book results in a hardly avoidable personal reflexion. Besides offering a defence of atheism and a reasonable and wellreasoned denounce of religion (although almost exclusively focused on the Christianity), the book leads the reader to the most fundamental philosophical questions, and this from a personal perspective. These reflexions are not as much a criticism of the theses of the book as an attempt to prolong the discussion.KEYWORDSATHEISM, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, BELIEF, ROBERTO AUGUSTO. (shrink)

Interest in ethical leadership from academics and practitioners has grown enormously in recent years. This article addresses this literature through a framework that identifies three interlocking questions. First, who are ethical leaders and what are their characteristics? Second, how do ethical leaders do what they do? Third, why do leaders do as they do and what are the outcomes of ethical leadership? Different dimensions to ethical leadership are examined and presented as three interlocking circles; Virtues, Purposes and Practices. This framework (...) presents an integrated approach to ethical leadership and argues that future research take this holistic framework and apply it to different sectors or contexts. (shrink)

Explanation and understanding are intimately connected notions, but the nature of that connection has generally not been considered a topic worthy of serious philosophical investigation. Most authors have avoided making reference to the notion of understanding in their accounts of explanation because they fear that any mention of the epistemic states of the individuals involved compromises the objectivity of explanation. Understanding is a pragmatic notion, they argue, and pragmatics should be kept at a safe distance from the universal features of (...) explanation. My main contention in this dissertation is that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize this notion it is necessary to formulate an account of objective explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. ;My account of explanation is based on the belief-doubt model of inquiry first proposed by Peirce. Using the tools provided by decision theory, and the models of belief revision developed by Isaac Levi and by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson, I analyze the objective and pragmatic conditions that a piece of information must fulfill to be both explanatory and epistemically useful to an inquiring agent. The objective basis for an explanation is provided by the relation of probabilistic relevance that the fact described by the explanans bares to the fact described by the explanandum. But an explanation is much more than its foundation. As an epistemological notion, a potential explanation can only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate an explanation in terms of its credibility, its content, and its explanatory value. I argue that although an objective measure of the credibility and content of an explanation can be established, in many cases a complete determination of its explanatory value will ultimately depend on the interests and goals of the individual inquirers. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretendemos avaliar criticamente algumas das teses de John McDowellsobre a natureza da virtude, tal como expostas em seu artigo “Virtue and Reason” e, ao fazê-lo,expor algumas de suas limitações. Mais especificamente, tratarei o que vejo como problemas emsua apresentação da virtude como uma forma de conhecimento, e sua proposta – corporificada natese da unidade das virtudes – de que as virtudes comumente reconhecidas deveriam ser vistascomo manifestações parciais da virtude enquanto tal. Também enfocarei a assertiva de McDowellde que (...) o conhecimento que constitui a virtude não pode ser visto como tendo um conteúdoproposicional que se preste a uma codificação em princípios de conduta – a tese de nãocodificabilidade– e a relação da postura pessoal de McDowell com a empreitada mais ampla daética de virtudes. (shrink)

In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy (...) have engaged in important controversies around the conjunction fallacy. The goal of this paper is to explore the most important of these controversies, namely, the controversy about the nature of the conjunction fallacy. Is the conjunction fallacy mainly due to a misunderstanding of the problem by participants (misunderstanding hypothesis) or is it mainly due to a genuine reasoning bias (reasoning bias hypothesis)? A substantial portion of research on the topic has been directed to test the misunderstanding hypothesis. I review this literature and argue that a stronger case can be made against the misunderstanding hypothesis. Thus, I indirectly provide support for the reasoning bias hypothesis. (shrink)

En Ciencia de la lógica, Hegel finaliza la lógica objetiva con un largo estudio de las categorías modales (realidad, necesidad y posibilidad). Nuestra propuesta es que tal estudio hay que entenderlo en confrontación directa con la situación dejada por Kant en los principios del entendimiento puro de KrV. Para defender tal tesis expondremos, en primer lugar, la exposición kantiana del problema; en segundo lugar, el desarrollo de la lógica de la esencia dentro de la obra; y, por último, la nueva (...) interpretación que propone Hegel de las categorías modales. (shrink)

Ante la devaluación de la formación universitaria debido a la escisión entre docencia e investigación, se propone la “investigación formativa” como fórmula de aprendizaje significativo. Se ofrece un marco epistemológico basado en la complejidad del conocimiento en Humanidades, y un planteamiento metodológico organizado sobre la transversalidad y convergencia disciplinar. Se presentan resultados de su aplicación en el estudio de problemas relacionados con el patrimonio arquitectónico y urbanístico. Se muestran casos de estudios diversos que demuestran su flexibilidad, su interactividad en el (...) aprendizaje y su potencialidad de transcender de la comunidad universitaria a la ciudadanía en general. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

At a time when ideas of crisis and critique are at the forefront of public discourse, this article seeks to understand moments of crisis vis-à-vis critique as a key feature of critical social theory. It addresses Jürgen Habermas’s strong claim that this relationship accounts for a ‘model of analysis’ concerned with grasping the ‘diremptions’ of social life. To elaborate this reading, the article pays attention to the main problems Habermas identifies in conventional ways of understanding the concepts of ‘crisis’ and (...) ‘critique’ in social theory. The aim is to examine the mode in which he reconsiders each of these terms and then reasserts the dialectical link between them. I reconstruct this relationship by taking as cases two of his most substantive works of social theorizing: The Theory of Communicative Action, and Between Facts and Norms. Based on this interpretation, I suggest that though Habermas contributes to resituating the practice of critique as a communicative translation of objective crisis, he does not adequately account for another key movement: when critique actually initiates, enacts and furthers the moment of crisis. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 48, Issue 1, pp 1 - 28 This paper is an attempt to think through Derrida’s newly discovered _Geschlecht III_, the third and missing installment of Derrida’s four part series on Heidegger and _Geschlecht_. I argue that Derrida’s reading of Heidegger in _Geschlecht III_ needs to be situated within the philosophico-political context of Derrida’s 1984–85 seminar—given under the general title _Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism_—from which _Geschlecht III_ is extracted. In the first part of the paper, I reconstruct (...) Derrida’s general problematic of national-humanism as he lays it out in the opening sessions of the seminar, before arriving at his reading of Heidegger, who will be part of “a sequence of German national-philosophism,” as Derrida calls it. In the second part, the paper turns explicitly to _Geschlecht III_ where, as I show, Derrida’s thoroughgoing denunciation of a national-humanism in Heidegger becomes all the more telling when seen through the theoretical matrix of the seminar. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to offer a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s work as an ally of critical theory. My contention is that, despite customary accusations of Koselleck being an anti-Enlightenment historian detrimental to social criticism and emancipatory politics, his investigations on the semantic fabric of modern society may actually expand our resources for the critique of domination. In order to make this argument plausible, I reconstruct some antinomies that are at the basis of Koselleck’s work (state/society, language/reality, (...) experience/expectation) and discuss their critical potential. This analysis shows that, rather than a rejection of the spirit of critique, Koselleck contributes to the temporalization of the practice of critique as such: namely, a clarification of the contradictions and potentials of a reflexive practice imbued in the struggle between the need to comprehend the world as it is and the right to experiment with other forms of life. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the link between different types and degrees of experience that can be gone through within a form of life or collectivity—the so-called levels of immersion—and the development of distinct types of tacit knowledge and expertise. The framework is then probed empirically and theoretically. In the first case, its ‘predictions’ are compared with the accounts of novices who have gone through different ‘learning opportunities’ during a pre-operational training programme for running a huge nickel industrial plant in Brazil. (...) These are also analysed vis-à-vis the experience of an expert who has designed and experienced the outcomes of two pre-operational training sessions in the nickel industry before developing and managing the one discussed here. Theoretically, the framework is used to pinpoint exactly what interactional experts who have developed their expertise through linguistic socialisation alone are able to do as well as to analyse the case of technical connoisseurs. The results indicate that the proposed framework is useful. It supports the design and improvement of training programmes for the development of tacit knowledge while at the same time bringing about a refined analysis of claims concerning the abilities of types of experts and expertise. (shrink)

How can we identify and estimate workers’ tacit knowledge? How can we design a personnel mix aimed at improving and speeding up its transfer and development? How is it possible to implement tacit knowledge sustainable projects in remote areas? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between types of tacit knowledge, to establish what they allow for and to consider their sources. It is also essential to find a way of managing the tacit knowledge ‘stock’ and (...) distribution within the workforce. In short, a conceptual framework is needed to manage tacit knowledge. Based on previous works and 2 years of action research, this paper introduces such a framework and describes its partial application to support the pre-operational training and hiring in a large industrial plant in Brazil. Two contributions emerge from the research. First, the concept of ‘levels of similarity’ is introduced as a means to qualify the experience of workers and estimate the associated tacit knowledge. Second, the capability of carrying out three types of judgement properly and speedily is put forward as being a core ability of those who possess what has been called ‘collective tacit knowledge’ (Collins in Organ Stud 28(2):257–262, 2007). In practical terms, the results indicate the opportunity for companies to capitalize on the experience and tacit knowledge of their workers in a systematic way and with due recognition. Ultimately, positive impacts are expected in their absorptive capacity as well as in their management and human resources systems, accident prevention, productivity and the development of sustainable projects in remote areas. (shrink)

To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. (...) In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

Meu objetivo aqui é o de abordar os escritos iniciais de Wittgenstein com base na tradição do misticismo filosófico. O benefício de minha leitura se deve ao fato de permitir uma certa clarificação no que tange a determinadas passagens obscuras, além de trazer à tona perspectivas inexploradas concernentes ao período inicial do autor; fase esta que, em minha opinião, ainda requer um nível de escrutínio adicional.Entendo que especialmente no caso do Tractatus, Wittgenstein não incida no místico por conta de uma (...) limitação da perquirição lógico-linguística relacionada a determinadas regiões do conhecimento, pelo contrário. Irei sugerir que a aplicação da lógica ocorre com o propósito de estabelecer o escopo do místico. Portanto, o que proporei em seguida é a tentativa de desenvolvimento de uma “interpretação mística” emrelação aos escritos iniciais do autor.AbstractMy goal here is to approach Wittgenstein’s initial writings based on the tradition of philosophical mysticism. The benefit of my reading is that it will allow some clarification in regard to obscure passages and still unexplored perspectives concerning this initial period which, in my opinion, still require additional scrutiny. As I see it, especially when it comes to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein does not “arrive” at the mystical due to the failure of a logical-linguistic inquiry/analysis related to certain realms of knowledge, on the contrary. I will make a case for supposing that the application of logic occurs with the purpose of establishing the scope of the mystical. Therefore, what I propose here is an attempt to develop a “mystical interpretation” of the initial writings of the author. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

This paper tracks Derrida’s allusion to the “phoenix motif” in the recently published Life Death seminar, showing how it foreshadows and overlaps with the political problematic of “national humanism” made explicit in Geschlecht III. I argue that, be it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, biological life is always in the service of a spiritual life that finds its breath in a certain reappropriation of the German idiom. Following Derrida, I argue that this “philosophy-of-life German” (cet allemand philosophe de la (...) vie) introduces a sinister equivocality between these thinkers and National Socialism, and this in spite of all their prudence to shield their discourses from such a co-option. (shrink)

This paper tracks Derrida’s allusion to the “phoenix motif” in the recently published Life Death seminar, showing how it foreshadows and overlaps with the political problematic of “national humanism” made explicit in Geschlecht III. I argue that, be it in Hegel, Fichte, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, biological life is always in the service of a spiritual life that finds its breath in a certain reappropriation of the German idiom. Following Derrida, I argue that this “philosophy-of-life German” introduces a sinister equivocality between (...) these thinkers and National Socialism, and this in spite of all their prudence to shield their discourses from such a co-option. (shrink)

In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...) step even when we want to deny its existence. The link between consciousness and some other mental activity is a logical next step and there is abundant literature doing this, but not all of them differentiate among associated yet different phenomena. (shrink)

This article addresses the issues related to the problem of classification of mental disorders in psychiatry in the context of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. First, some background information is provided on the history of the classification of mental disorders and the evolution that DSM has had over time is shown. Secondly, the delimitation of the normal and the pathological in psychiatry is investigated through Canguilhem's medical-philosophical thought. Thirdly, the biopolitical management of psychic (...) sufferings is reflected in the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-V and its increasing medicalization. Finally, an approach to the concepts of health and disease in Canguilhem is made as it incorporates existential and experiential variables absent in the DSM-V classifications and in the psychiatric diagnosis. (shrink)